# DANIEL MINKIN: COMPLETE LIST OF PUBLICATIONS AND FURTHER INFORMATION

## Research interests and fields of expertise

- Metaphilosophy:
  - Definitions of philosophy, philosophical methodology, metaphilosophical skepticism, philosophical and metaphilosophical disagreement
- Ontology/metaphysics:
  - Physicalism and naturalism
  - Ontology of events
- Epistemology:
  - Metaepistemology (especially experimental epistemology)
  - Epistemology of disagreement
  - Applied epistemology (especially epistemology of conspiracy theories and fake news)
- Philosophy of Computer Science
  - Epistemic Opacity
  - AI in criminological contexts
- Philosophy of science
  - General philosophy of science (especially the demarcation problem)
  - Philosophy of social sciences
- Critical theory (Frankfurt School)

## Publications

### Books

Minkin, Daniel (in preparation): Theoretische Philosophie. Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung. [Theoretical Philosophy. An application-oriented introduction], to be published by UTB in 2024.

Minkin, Daniel (in preparation): Verschwörungstheorien. Eine interdisziplinäre Einführung [Conspiracy Theories. An Interdisciplinary Introduction], to be published by SpringerNature in 2024.

Lewin, Michael/Minkin, Daniel (eds.) (in preparation): Handbuch Metaphilosophie [Handbook Meta-philosophy], to be published 2026 by Metzler.

Minkin, Daniel (2021): Rationalität philosophischer Forschung. Grundlagen einer metaphilosophischen Positionierung [Rationality of Philosophical Research. Foundations of a Metaphilosophical Positioning]. Paderborn: Mentis.

## Articles

Minkin, Daniel (in preparation): Verschwörungstheorien und Wissenschaftsleugnung. Einige Lehren aus der Wissenschaftstheorie [Conspiracy Theories and Science Denial. Some Teachings from Philosophy of Science], appears 2023 in: Christian, Alexander/Gawel, Ina (eds.): Wissenschaftsleugnung – Fallstudien, philosophische Analysen und Vorschläge zur Wissenschaftskommunikation. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Schmidt, Elvira/Minkin, Daniel (in preparation): Beutelsbacher Konsens und Esoterische Paramedizin: Gesundheitsförderung aus philosophischer und biologiedidaktischer Perspektive [Beutelsbacher Konsens and esoteric paramedicine: Health promotion from a philosophical and biological-didactic perspective], appears 2024 in: Martins, Ansgar/Kranemann, Philipp W. (eds.): Esoterik und politische Bildung. Frankfurt: Wochenschau Verlag.

Minkin, Daniel (in preparation): Rationalität zwischen Lehnstuhl und Labor. Wissen und epistemische Rechtfertigung aus erkenntnistheoretischer und experimenteller Perspektiv. [Rationality between arm chair and laboratory. Knowledge and epistemic justification from an epistemological and experimental perspective], appears 2023 in: Cultura & Psyche.

Minkin, Daniel (2022a): Philosophie der Verschwörungstheorien. Eine kommentierte Übersicht über die philosophische Debatte [Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. An Annotated Overview of the Philosophical Debate]. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 76 (3). pp. 404-436.

Minkin, Daniel (2022b): Über die Schwierigkeit der Philosophie mit den Verschwörungstheorien [On the Difficulty of Philosophy with Conspiracy Theories]. In: Information Philosophie 2022 (2). pp. 44-56.

Minkin, Daniel (under review): Kant als metaphilosophischer Skeptizist? [Kant as a Metaphilosophical Skeptic?]

Minkin, Daniel (under review): Conspiracy Theories, Artificial Intelligence, and Misinformation.

Minkin, Daniel (under review): The Generalist-Repressivist Research Program in the Research on Conspiracy Theories. German Failures and Tasmanian Teachings.

## Reviews

Minkin, Daniel (2020): Kulturtheoretische Betrachtungen zu Verschwörungs-theorien. Philosophische Anmerkungen zu Michael Butters „Nichts ist, wie es scheint" [Culture Studies' considerations on conspiracy theories. Philosophical comments on Michael Butter's *Nichts ist, wie es scheint*], in: Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 14 (1), pp. 174-177.

Minkin, Daniel/Sydow, Björn (2017): [Review of] Holm Tetens: *Gott denken. Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie*, in: Zeitschrift für philosophische Literatur 5, (2), pp. 64-72.

Minkin, Daniel (2014): Review of Felix Mühlhölzer: *Wissenschaft*, in: [Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschafts-theorie](http://...) 45 (1), pp. 213-216.

## Articles in encyclopedias

Minkin, Daniel (2015a): Naturalisierbarkeit [Naturalizability], in: Schierholz, Stefan J./Wiegand, Herbert Ernst (Hrsg.) (2015): Wörterbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft (WSK) Online. 25. Bde., Bd. 15: Demmerling, Christoph/Stekeler-Weithofer, Primen: "Sprachphilosophie". Online: [http://www.degruyter.com/view/WSK/wsk_id_wsk_artikel_artikel_28757?rskey=mgiXF2&result=2&dbq_0=naturalismus&dbf_0=wsk-fulltext&dbt_0=fulltext&o_0=AND](http://www.degruyter.com/view/WSK/wsk_id_wsk_artikel_artikel_28757?rskey=mgiXF2&result=2&dbq_0=naturalismus&dbf_0=wsk-fulltext&dbt_0=fulltext&o_0=AND)

Minkin, Daniel (2015b): Naturalisierung [Naturalization], in: Schierholz, Stefan J./Wiegand, Herbert Ernst (Hrsg.) (2015): Wörterbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft (WSK) Online. 25. Bde., Bd. 15: Demmerling, Christoph/Stekeler-Weithofer, Primen: "Sprachphilosophie". Online: [http://www.degruyter.com/view/WSK/wsk_id_wsk_artikel_artikel_29188?rskey=mgiXF2&result=3&dbq_0=naturalismus&dbf_0=wsk-fulltext&dbt_0=fulltext&o_0=AND](http://www.degruyter.com/view/WSK/wsk_id_wsk_artikel_artikel_29188?rskey=mgiXF2&result=3&dbq_0=naturalismus&dbf_0=wsk-fulltext&dbt_0=fulltext&o_0=AND)

Minkin, Daniel (2015c): Naturalismus [Naturalism], in: Schierholz, Stefan J./Wiegand, Herbert Ernst (Hrsg.) (2015): Wörterbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft (WSK) Online. 25. Bde., Bd. 15: Demmerling, Christoph/Stekeler-Weithofer, Primen: 'Sprachphilosophie'. Online: [http://www.degruyter.com/view/WSK/wsk_id_wsk_artikel_artikel_29408?rskey=mgiXF2&result=4&dbq_0=naturalismus&dbf_0=wsk-fulltext&dbt_0=fulltext&o_0=AND](http://www.degruyter.com/view/WSK/wsk_id_wsk_artikel_artikel_29408?rskey=mgiXF2&result=4&dbq_0=naturalismus&dbf_0=wsk-fulltext&dbt_0=fulltext&o_0=AND)

# Courses, lectures and colloquia

## Courses and lectures

**Summer 2023:** Träumst Du noch oder weißt Du schon? Eine Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie [Are you still dreaming or do you already know? An introduction to epistemology], University of Wuppertal

**Summer 2023:** Who is an expert?, University of Wuppertal

**Summer 2022:** Einführung in die Theoretische Philosophie [Introduction to theoretical philosophy], (lecture) University of Marburg

**Winter 2021/22:** Do We Need Intuition? University of Marburg

**Summer 2021:** Einführung in die Theoretische Philosophie [Introduction to theoretical philosophy], (lecture) University of Marburg → Recording of the lecture, available at: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCNyXxysyAmuZsHxTZlYba3g

**Summer 2021:** Dämonen und Hellseherei. Neuere Forschung zur epistemischen Rechtfertigung [Demons and clairvoyance. current research on epistemic justification], University of Marburg

**Winter 2020/21:** Was es nicht alles gibt! Einführung in die Ontologie [Stone the Crows! Introduction to ontology], University of Marburg

**Winter 2020/21:** Brain vs. Brain? Streiten in und mit der Wissenschaft [Brain vs. brain? Arguing in and with science], University of Marburg

**Summer 2020:** Einführung in die Theoretische Philosophie [Introduction to theoretical philosophy], (lecture) University of Marburg

**Winter 2019/20:** Wissenschaftstheorie in der Praxis. Biologische und philosophische Fragestellungen im Unterricht [Philosophy of science in practice. Biological and philosophical questions in education] (with Elvira Schmidt), University of Marburg

**Winter 2019/20:** Ist Angela Merkel ein Reptiloid? Die (vermeintliche) (Ir)rationalität von Verschwörungstheorien [Is Angela Merkel a reptoid? The (alleged) (ir)rationality of conspiracy theories], University of Marburg

**Winter 2019/20:** Wann stirbt die Philosophie? [When is philosophy going to die?] University of Marburg

**Summer 2019:** Analytische und synthetische Sätze, apriorische und aposteriorische Erkenntnis [Analytic and synthetic sentences, a priori and a posteriori knowledge], University of Marburg

**Winter 2018/19:** Was alles relativ ist. Relativistische und antirelativistische Positionen von Protagoras bis heute [It is all relative. Relativist and antirelativist positions from protagoras until today], University of Marburg

**Winter 2018/19:** Platon: *Phaidon* [Plato: *Phaedo*] (with Naemi Bremecker and Christoph Schäfer), University of Marburg

**Winter 2017/18:** Bis einer heult! Epistemologie des Streits [Until someone cries! Epistemology of disagreement], University of Marburg

**Winter 2017/18:** Klassiker der Wissenschaftsphilosophie: Imre Lakatos (eine Einführung) [Foundational work in philosophy of science: Imre Lakatos (an introduction], University of Marburg

**Summer 2017:** Die Philosophie W.V.O. Quines [The philosophy of W.V.O. Quine], University of Marburg

**Winter 2016/17:** Systematizität wissenschaftlichen Wissens [Systematicity of scientific research], University of Marburg

**Summer 2016:** Wittgensteins Philosophiebegriff(e) [Wittgenstein's concept(s) of philosophy], University of Düsseldorf

**Summer 2016:** Aktuelle Fragen der Metaphilosophie [Current issues in metaphilosophy], University of Marburg

**Winter 2015/16:** Thomas Nagel: *Mind and Cosmos*, University of Düsseldorf

**Summer 2015:** Einführung in die Ontologie [Introduction to ontology], University of Düsseldorf

**Winter 2014/2015:** Metaphilosophie [Metaphilosophy], University of Düsseldorf

**Summer 2014:** Was ist und was kann der philosophische Naturalismus? [What is naturalism and what is it able to do?], University of Düsseldorf

**Winter 2013/14:** Was sind Ereignisse? [What are events?], University of Gießen

**Winter 2013/14:** Was sind Ereignisse? [What are events?], University of Düsseldorf

## Colloquia and panel discussions

**Summer 2021:** „Gesunder Zweifel oder wahnhafte Spinnerei. Wissenschaftliche Perspektiven auf Verschwörungstheorien und ihre Vertreter*innen" ['Healthy doubt or delusional spinning. Scientific perspectives on conspiracy theories and their Proponents' (with Maik Niemeck (UMR2027)) → Recording of the panel discussion available at: https://youtu.be/-VpTJrapel0

**Summer 2017:** „Unsinn, Quatsch und Bullshit. Diesseits und jenseits rationaler Kritik" ['Nonsense, baloney, and bullshit. Rational criticism and beyond], Colloquium at University of Marburg

# Talks

**July 2023:** 'Experts: An application-oriented approach', at the Philosophy of Science Network, Munich, Germany

**June, 5, 2023:** „Sind wir uns einig? Was die Philosophie in Bedrängnis bringt (oder bringen könnte)" ['Are we in agreement? What brings (or could bring) philosophy into difficulties'], at the „Philosophisches Kolloquium", Wuppertal, Germany

**May 25, 2023:** 'Conspiracy Theories, Experts, and Intimidation', at the Workshop on Epistemic Intimidation, Wuppertal, Germany

**December 8, 2022:** 'Conspiracy Theories, AI, and Misinformation', at the CSS/HLRS Colloquium on Philosophy of Computational Sciences, Online

**September 21, 2022:** „Rationalität zwischen Lehnstuhl und Labor. Wissen und epistemische Rechtfertigung aus erkenntnistheoretischer und experimenteller Perspektive" ['Rationality between armchair and laboratory. Knowledge and epistemic justification from epistemological and experimental perspectives'], at the conference „Erfahrung und Empirie", organized by „Arbeitsgemeinschaft Philosophie & Psychologie", Heidelberg, Germany

**September 9, 2022 (invited):** 'Metaphilosophical Skepticism: A (New) Threat to Philosophy as a Rational Enterprise?', at the conference 'What is Metaphilosophy?', Oestrich-Winkel, Germany

**August 15, 2021:** 'Conspiracy Theories: Some Teachings from Philosophy of Science', at the 'The Fourth International Conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science', organized by German Society for Philosophy of Science, Berlin, Germany → Recording of the talk available at: https://youtu.be/mJDSsdGrAxM

**February 6, 2022:** 'The Generalist-Repressivist Research Program in the Research on Conspiracy Theories. German Failures and Tasmanian Teachings', at 'The 1st Beijing Normal University at Zhuhai Conspiracy Theory Conference', Beijing, China/Online → Recording of the talk available at: https://youtu.be/nNEc2hcX_ls

**January 21, 2022:** „Über das gegenwärtige Forschungsprogramm der Forschung zu Verschwörungserzählungen. Was es falsch macht und wie Philosoph*innen seine Fehler beseitigen könnten" ['On the current research program on conspiracy narratives. What it gets wrong and how philosophers might Fix its mistakes'], at the conference „Wo liegt die Wahrheit? Verschwörungserzählungen und ihre Rezeption", Augsburg/Online, Germany → Recording of the talk available at: https://youtu.be/rt2TddNn-XI

**October 25, 2021:** „Philosophical and Metaphilosophical Disagreement. Some Thoughts on Third-Stage-Scepticism", at the conference "Agreement and Disagreement Beyond Ethics and Epistemology", Canterbury, UK/Online

**September 30, 2021:** „Eine Ethik des Aluhuts? Ist es unmoralisch, an Verschwörungstheorien zu glauben oder diese zu verbreiten?" ['An ethics of the tin foil hat? Is it immoral to believe in or spread conspiracy theories?'], at the eighth conference for practical philosophy, Salzburg, Austria → Recording of the talk available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nnSfLEHylwI

**July 23, 2021:** „Streit ohne Geschichte. Historische Blindheit der Analytischen Philosophie am Beispiel einer aktuellen Debatte" ['Disagreement without history. Historical blindness of analytic philosophy on the example of a current debate'], at the workshop „Methode und Material. Philosophisches Arbeiten zwischen Systematik und Geschichte", organized by 'Netzwerk Philosophiehistorisches Arbeiten', Jena, Germany → Recording of the talk available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NL7iZCPcnTw

**June 6, 2019:** „Bielefeld und die Reptilienmenschen. Ein philosophisches Plädoyer für interdisziplinäre Forschung zu Verschwörungstheorien" ['Bielefeld and the reptoids. A philosophical plea for interdisciplinary research on conspiracy theories'], at the conference 'Philosophische Sommergespräche 2019', organized by the Institute for Philosophy, Erfurt, Germany

**May 23, 2018 (invited):** „Vielfalt des Zoffs. Worüber wir streiten können und was daraus folgt" ['Variety of quarrels. What we can argue about and what follows from it'], at the Philosophical Colloquium (Lunch Time Talk), organized by the Institute for Philosophy, Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany

**November 30, 2017:** „Philosophie in Bedrängnis. Was die Liebe zur Weisheit (wirklich) bedroht" ['Philosophy in distress. What (really) threatens the Love of

Wisdom'], at the PhD Symposium, organized by the Austrian Society for Philosophy, Klagenfurt, Austria

**May 12, 2017:** „Ontologie und Metaphilosophie im zeitgenössischen Naturalismus" ['Ontology and metaphilosophy in contemporary naturalism'], at the GAP-PhD workshop „Wissenschaftsphilosophie", Hannover, Germany

**September 16, 2016:** „Geschichte als Prämisse? Auf dem Weg zu einer Kuhn'schen Metaphilosophie" ['History as premise? On the way to a Kuhnian metaphilosophy'], at the 'Symposium of Swiss Philosophical Society', Genf, Switzerland

**June 9, 2016:** „Was kann der Naturalismus über das menschliche Leben sagen?" ['What can naturalism tell us about human life?'], at the Zurich Doctoral Workshop „Fragen zum menschlichen Leben", Zürich, Schwitzerland

**October 30, 2014 (invited):** „Streiten unter Regelführung? Überlegungen zur Sprachphilosophie und objektiver Hermeneutik" [Arguing under rule guidance? Reflections on philosophy of language and objective hermeneutics'], organized by „Studentische Arbeitsgruppe zur objektiven Hermeneutik an der Johann-Wolfgang-von- Goethe-Universität", Frankfurt, Germany

**May 28, 2014:** „Die naturalistische Matrix" ['The naturalistic matrix'], at the Philosophical Colloquium, organized by the Institute for Philosophy, Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany

**May 29, 2013:** „Grenzen und Möglichkeiten einer zweistufigen Ereignisindividuation" ['Limits and possibilities of a two-stage individuation of events'], at the Philosophical Colloquium, organized by the Institute for Philosophy, Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany

# Reviewer activities

**2021:** Bundesgesundheitsblatt
**2015:** Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy

# Outline of the PhD thesis: *Rationality of Philosophical Research. Foundations of a Metaphilosophical Positioning*

What is philosophy? What is its subject? What is it good for? And how should we do it? Although these questions have been asked by almost all philosophers since Plato, it is only a few years ago that a philosophical sub-discipline emerged in which these questions are revisited. This sub-discipline is called "metaphilosophy" or "philosophy of philosophy." A large number of philosophers have already given interesting answers to the questions posed. However, in the literature dealing with these questions, there is no systematic attempt to answer the overarching question of what distinguishes metaphilosophy.

The dissertation begins by answering this question. In a first step, a general and, according to the claim, largely extension-adequate characterization of contemporary metaphilosophy is undertaken. To this end, positions that are treated as metaphilosophical in contemporary debates are reconstructed and interpreted. The following positions are examined:

{1} Metaphilosophical Deflationism
{2} Metaphilosophical Essentialism
{3} Timothy Williamson's *Philosophy of Philosophy*
{4} Metaphilosophical foundations of experimental philosophy
{5} The metaphilosophical position of the early Wittgenstein and the positions within the New Wittgenstein debate
{6} The metaphilosophical position of the late Wittgenstein und Paul Horwich's therapeutic metaphilosophy
{7} Nicholas Rescher's Orientational Pluralism
{8} W.V.O. Quine's Naturalistic Metaphilosophy

On the basis of the empirical material thus obtained, a distinction is made between descriptive and normative metaphilosophy: Descriptive metaphilosophy consists in various attempts to define the concept of philosophy or to explain otherwise what philosophy actually is (positions {1} and {2}). These attempts are criticized. Moreover, it is noted that the main focus of the authors involved in the metaphilosophical debates is on normative answers to the question of what philosophy is or what philosophy should be. In doing so, it is shown that there are several equally consistently held metaphilosophical positions in contemporary debates ({3} to {8}) that are incompatible with each other.

In a second step, the question is asked whether such metaphilosophical disagreements can be resolved or dissolved by rational arguments. To this end, the PhD project first examines what kinds of disagreements exist and what structural features different kinds of dissents have. This examination thus ties in with the analytic debate on disagreement that has been going on within analytic epistemology for about 20 years. It is argued that the descriptive tools provided by this debate are insufficient to adequately describe metaphilosophical disagreements; in particular, it is shown that metaphilosophical disagreements are neither purely linguistic nor purely genuine. Rather, the argumentation of the dissertation project determines them as certain value disagreements in which there is no resolution procedure on which the parties involved in the conflict could agree.

According to this line of argument, the circumstance described leads to the position that is called "second-stage metaphilosophical skepticism." This states that the existence of metaphilosophical disagreements (in the sense explained) undermines the justification of any philosophical positions - which see themselves as such - and thus threatens the philosophical research as a rational enterprise.

In the last step a proposal is made to deal with the described problem. First the mentioned difficulty is demonstrated in detail at a position ({8}) which is assigned to philosophical naturalism. Naturalism is probably regarded as the most widespread family of theories in Western philosophy today. Therefore, it is natural to choose this family of theories as the object of investigation. The basic idea of philosophical naturalism is the attempt to reduce phenomena that are not the subject of scientific research to objects of such research or to phenomena that consist of such objects. For example, some naturalists attempt to reduce the extension of mental predicates to the extension of physical predicates. The dissertation project argues for the fact that the problem described in step two also applies to all naturalistic positions.

Subsequently, a proposal for dealing with this problem is formulated. This proposal consists in applying models of theory building, as formulated by Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos, to philosophical positionings. The common feature of these models is that they describe how groups of scientific theories (paradigms, disciplinary matrices, research programs) share common beliefs and values (basic assumptions) that are usually not questioned by the proponents of these theories and with which these theory groups distinguish themselves from other theory groups. Crucially, these basic assumptions do not make the theories based on them dogmatic or irrational-even when these basic assumptions have not themselves been justified. The application of such models to metaphilosophical and philosophical positions demonstrated at the end of the overall argument shows that philosophical families of theories can also be understood as such groups. I.e.: Even if the metaphilosophical assumptions presupposed by philosophical positions are not justified - which is shown in a metaphilosophical disagreement according to second-level metaphilosophical skepticism - there is still room to hold to the rationality of philosophical positions.

The PhD thesis can be understood as a contribution to a transcendental philosophy of philosophy, insofar as the main argumentation asks about the conditions of the possibility of rational philosophizing. However, the argumentation presented makes no claim to ultimate validity: that the possibility of second-level metaphilosophical skepticism exists follows only from the core claim that in metaphilosophical disputes there is no commonly shared solution procedure. This core assertion, in turn, only claims to be the best explanation for the persistent disagreements within philosophy.